# Aff Answers

### 2AC---NUQ

#### It’s non-unique.

NATO 6-30-2022. "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept". https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/. DL

24. We will expedite our digital transformation, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance our cyber defences, networks and infrastructure. We will promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge. We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights.

25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.

#### And climate, authoritarians, and non-military threats.

RANE 6-30-2022. Risk Assistance Network + Exchange, risk intelligence company used by 400 corporations, government agencies, academic institutions and over 1.5M members. "Placing NATO’s New Strategic Concept in Context". Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/placing-nato-s-new-strategic-concept-context. DL

The 2022 Strategic Concept highlights new cybersecurity, climate change, authoritarian governance and other non-military threats as well. Climate change was mentioned only once in the 2010 Strategic Concept. But in the 2022 version, it is mentioned 11 times, including the ambitious statement that NATO should “become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Additional attention is also given to cyberattacks. The alliance reaffirmed its longstanding policy that a “single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space” could prompt NATO to trigger its Article 5 mutual defense clause — another measure directed first and foremost toward Russia and China and intended to deter cyberattacks causing physical damage, as otherwise the alliance would be skeptical of triggering Article 5 because of a cyberattack. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept on several occasions notes the challenge to the alliance’s interests and values posed by advancing authoritarianism — a threat not acknowledged directly in 2010.

NATO’s updated Strategic Concept acknowledges non-military threats such as identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. These new threats underscore the increasing importance of reliable partners in geographies outside the NATO alliance such as in Asia, from where the alliance must ensure the stability and security of supplies of critical components and resources.

### 2AC --- L/T --- NATO Solves Disagreements

#### NATO can spearhead quick adoption of EDT that reduces use of resources and disagreement

Koegler et al ‘18

(Torsten Gojowsky, Sebastian Koegler, Bernardus Haspels, Flemming Haar, and Sverre Wetteland,Torsten Gojowsky is a U.S. Army officer. Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer. Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer. Sebastian Koegle is a German officer. Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer. All are students at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “Resistance to Innovation in NATO,” pg online @ https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato)

Innovative technologies face the dilemma of military leaders who are uncertain of their possible benefits versus their potential risks. Yet the pacing gap has kept military leadership from confronting this dilemma in a timely manner. Tactical Assault Kit can form the base of a future communication platform for NATO SOF. However, this vision for the future will only be feasible if the need for connectivity among NATO special operations forces is persistently socialized and eventually accepted. NATO Special Operations Headquarters can function as a key hub of this socialization process. As a premier NATO special operations schoolhouse, it trains and educates member states special operations soldiers in areas including communication technology. Such education can focus on learning the basics of emerging technology and how to employ those unique technical capabilities. By creating a consensus for a way ahead and also facilitating basic courses via their schoolhouse in Belgium, NATO special operations forces as a whole might be able to step into the future outfitted with the best possible means of fighting in an increasingly complex world of near-peer competitors and hostile networks.

### 2AC --- Unity = Fake

#### Stratcon unity is a facade

Lee 7/1/22 [James, reporter for Express UK; “NATO cracks exposed: Call for members to be KICKED OUT as alliance 'only inch deep'”; July 1, 2022; DOA: 7/4/22; <https://www.express.co.uk/news/science/1633935/nato-cracks-exposed-alliance-members-kicked-out-security-defence-news>; Lowell-ES]

However, the cracks are beginning to show with one commentator suggesting the thinly veiled family photo may not be one of a happy alliance. Matthew Karnitschnig, Politico's chief European correspondent who was at the summit, said: “Look beyond the staged backslapping, bonhomie and self-congratulation in Madrid, however, and one can see that while the alliance’s unity might be a mile wide, it’s also only an inch deep, its collective sense of purpose as varied as its 30 members.” Much discussion has arisen over the financial commitment seen by NATO members. In fact, at one point, Mr Trump threatened to pull out of the alliance as a matter of point, resulting in a quick pledge by members to increase their spending. Germany, France and the UK have all hinted at increasing defence spending over the next decade, with the UK aiming to hit 2.5 percent of GDP following pressure by Defence Secretary Ben Wallace to increase the budget. The US is still by far the largest contributor to the alliance, with around 3.5 percent of its GDP dedicated to defence.

### 2AC --- Aff Solves Cyber OStretch

#### NATO coop on cyber solves cyber overstretch

Maigre 4/6/22

(Merle, senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. In 2017–2018, she served as director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)in Tallinn; in 2012–2017 as the security policy adviser to Estonian Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid and Thoomas Hendrik Ilves; and in 2010–2012 in the Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of NATO Security General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. She is a member of the Executive Board of the Cyber Peace Institute in Geneva and the International Advisory Board of NATO CCDCOE, “NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security,” pg online @ <https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security> //um-ef)

More operational- and technical-level joint activities should be practiced among allies and with like-minded partners in order to contribute to imposing costs to malicious actors in cyberspace. Given that NATO’s cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO’s own networks, bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and, in the event of an emergency, provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response.

### 2AC --- N/L --- Spending

#### $1B in cyber and AI now – aff is a part of the budget

Miller 6/29/22 [Maggie, cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO; “NATO establishes program to coordinate rapid response to cyberattacks”; 06/29/2022; DOA: 7/5/22; <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/29/nato-cyberattacks-russia-00043149>; Lowell-ES]

NATO member countries on Wednesday agreed in Madrid to create a new program to quickly respond to cyberattacks.

Russian threat: The “virtual rapid response cyber capability” comes after months of Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine as part of the war and amid concerns that Moscow may target the United States and other NATO countries in retaliation for assistance to Ukraine.

The program is voluntary. According to a fact sheet put out by the White House on Wednesday, the U.S. will offer “robust national capabilities” to support this program.

There’s more: NATO also announced a separate package of cyber assistance to Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the White House immediately responded to questions about the scope of the new programs.

New strategy: In a new strategy document, NATO reaffirmed a 2021 commitment that a cyberattack could (but would not automatically) trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which would make it an attack against the alliance as a whole. It also pledged to work with the private sector to counter threats, formally recognized threats in cyberspace posed by Russia and China, and promised to update NATO’s command structure to reflect new cyber threats.

More research funds: Officials speaking prior to the strategy’s release on the condition that they not be identified told POLITICO that NATO’s new strategy will include over $1 billion to fund research into emerging technologies including quantum computing and artificial intelligence..

### 2AC --- N/L --- Stratcon

#### Aff proves implementation of stratcon

NATO 6/29/22 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; “NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT”; June 29, 2022; DOA: 7/1/22; <https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf>; Lowell-ES]

25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.

### 2AC---N/L---AI Logistics

#### AI logistics uncontroversial

Franke 21 [Ulrike, Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”; January 2021; DOA: 7/23/22; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123>; Lowell-ES]

However, military AI includes many non-controversial uses, such as ‘sustainment’, which encompasses logistics as well as support activities such as financial management, personnel services, and health care. AI helps make these services more efficient and cost-effective; for example, predictive maintenance helps in monitoring a system, such as an aircraft, and can do things such as use various sensory inputs and data analysis to predict when parts of a system will need to be replaced. Equally, AI can help improve logistics’ efficiency by, for instance, ensuring that supplies are delivered in appropriate quantities and at the right time. Transatlantic cooperation in this field is uncontroversial, but extremely useful – especially when carried out within NATO, as this could help bring allies closer together, establish joint procedures, and thereby ensure interoperability.

### 2AC---N/L---Pressure

#### US pressure undermines cohesion – the plan pushes the fine line

Schnaufer 21 [Tad, doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida ; “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies”; January 15, 2021; DOA: 7/18/22; <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/>; Lowell-ES]

It may seem that these tensions and fears will only lead to negative outcomes, but some disunity within an alliance can yield positive results. Several articles researching the implications of free-riding and burdening-sharing in alliances have supported this notion. In Olson and Zeckhauser’s seminal article on burden-sharing, they wrote, “This fact leads to the paradoxical conclusion that a decline in the amity, unity, and community of interest among allies need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of an alliance…” and “The United States, at least, should perhaps not hope for too much unity in common ventures with other nations. It might prove extremely expensive.” Similarly, Plumper and Neumayer note in reference to the smaller allies (non-US allies), “Unless the interests of alliance members are independent, the existence of NATO allows the smaller allies to free-ride to some extent.”

### 2AC---AT: I/L---Forward Defense Fails

#### Current NATO policy doesn’t solve Ukraine – only the aff does

Mengelkamp et al 7/27 [Lukas Mengelkamp, historian based at the University of Marburg / Alexander Graef, Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy / Ulrich Kuhn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DEFENSE FOR NATO”; JUNE 27, 2022; <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/a-confidence-building-defense-for-nato/>; Accessed 7/23/22; Lowell-ES]

The problem with forward defense, however, is that while it sounds good, it is not clear what it would mean in practice, or how it would play out against the many divergences and disagreements between NATO members. Instead, allies should embrace a strategy of confidence-building defense. To revive this late Cold War concept, NATO’s eastern members would create a highly mobile net of dispersed artillery, while more powerful European allies would build and supply heavy weapons depots in those countries, then prepare to rapidly deploy significant forces in case of a crisis. This approach would enable European allies to contribute to their own security, lessen first-strike pressures, and avoid deepening a dangerous new security dilemma with Russia.

No matter how confident allies seem to be about NATO’s current unity, there are a number of key uncertainties that could make forward defense difficult to implement effectively. If Russia’s military continues to struggle in Ukraine, or if America’s commitment to European security falters again, NATO would benefit from a more flexible, less forward strategy.